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Seeing Through A Glass Darkly: The SuJ>reme 
Court's Narrowed Definition of Disability 
Scott E. Ferrin· 
The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Albertsons Inc. v. 
Kirkingburg/ Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 2 Murphy v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc. ,3 and New York State Board of Law 
Examiners v. Bartlett,4 have narrowed the definition of disabil-
ity for the purposes of the Americans With Disabilities Act 
[ADA]. 5 Collectively analyzed, these decisions may add up to a 
narrowly tailored refinement that aids judicial and political 
economy in a difficult area of the law, or they may be manifes-
tations of a tunnel vision that ignores the rights and needs of 
individuals the ADA was intended to cover. It appears that the 
narrow definition of disability enunciated in these cases impact 
higher education, and to a lesser degree may come to impact 
schools in providing ameliorating measures and accommoda-
tions for students with special needs or disabilities-especially 
learning disabilities. 
In Albertsons, Sutton, and Murphy the Supreme Court nar-
rowly defined who is considered to have a disability and thus 
narrowed who has the right to "reasonable accommodation" 
under the ADA. For example, in Sutton, the Court determined 
that those whose disabilities can be corrected or alleviated by 
corrective devices, such as eyeglasses or medication are no 
longer regarded as "having a disability." The three cases to-
gether declare that those having high blood pressure, myopia, 
and/or monocular vision do not qualify as individuals with dis-
abilities if such conditions can be corrected with blood pressure 
medication or glasses. The slightly unusual outcome of this 
* Scott Ellis Ferrin earned his J.D. from Brigham Young University J. Reuben Clark 
Law School in 1984 and his Ed. D. from Harvard University in 1996. He currently 
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1. 527 U.S. 555 (1999). 
2. 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
3. 527 u.s. 516 (1999). 
4. 1999 U.S. LEXIS 4425; 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999). 
5. 42 U.S.C. §12101 (1990). 
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narrowing of the definitions of disability is that if a condition is 
correctable, (e.g., if an employee's vision is adequate with cor-
rective lenses), those employees can be fired or denied a job as 
a pilot or truck driver. However, if an employee or individual's 
situation or disability is uncorrectable, they may not be denied 
a job, or lose employment without being offered reasonable ac-
commodations. 6 
This narrowing of the definition of disability also has impli-
cations in dealing with learning disabilities of students in 
schools and colleges, and in certifying boards. In New York 
State Board of Law Examiners v. Bartlett, a recent law school 
graduate, holding a doctorate in educational administration, 
charged that the New York Board of Law Examiners' failure to 
accommodate her reading disability during the bar exam vio-
lated her rights under the ADA. 7 The court noted that 
[s]ince 1991, Dr. Bartlett has taken the bar examination 
five times. On at least three and possibly four separate 
occasions, she has applied as a reading disabled candi-
date to take the bar examination with accommoda-
tions .... The Board has denied her request each time, 
contending that her application does not support a di-
agnosis of a reading disability or dyslexia. In total, Dr. 
Bartlett has taken the examination four times without 
accommodations and has yet to pass. In her complaint, 
she sought, among ... other things, injunctive relief in 
the form of reasonable testing accommodations and 
compensatory damages for fees paid in connection with 
past attempts to pass the examination.8 
Accordingly, the lower court held that Bartlett's disability 
had to be evaluated as to whether it was a disability, with no 
regard to mitigating measures such as providing more time 
during an exam.9 Using that evaluative stance, the Second Cir-
cuit found that Bartlett did have a disability, and thus the 
Board of Law Examiners was required to reasonably accommo-
date her disability. 
6. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490. 
7. See 1999 U.S. LEXIS 4425; 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999). 
8. Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, 156 F.3d 321, 324-35 (2"'' 
Cir. 1999). 
9. See id. 
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However, the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit's 
decision in Bartlett and remanded for reconsideration based on 
the standards of Albertsons, Sutton, and Murphy. In harmony 
with these cases, it appears that if a mitigating measure, such 
as providing more time to take tests, will correct the problem, 
then a student or a bar applicant does not have a right to rea-
sonable accommodation during testing. 
This relatively unusual outcome, evidently mandated by 
Albertsons, Sutton, and Murphy, has already been commented 
upon in an unpublished dissenting opinion from the Sixth Cir-
cuit. In his dissent Judge Ronald Gilman states: 
In essence, the magistrate judge concluded that a person 
does not have a disability for purposes of the ADA if he 
or she can function adequately with special accommoda-
tions not required by the average person in the general 
population. This accords with no one's understanding of 
the word "disability" either as the word is used in the 
ADA or in the English language generally. The Supreme 
Court, of course, has held that corrective measures, such 
as eyeglasses and high-blood pressure medication, must 
be taken into account in determining whether a person 
has a disability for purposes of the ADA. . . . But I do 
not believe that the assistance of other human beings in 
digesting school material could conceivably be consid-
ered a "corrective measure" like eyeglasses are for the 
nearsighted, or high-blood pressure medication for the 
hypertensive. The question that the magistrate judge 
should have asked-but did not-was whether Shepler 
[the plaintiff] produced evidence from which a reason-
able factfinder could conclude that she is significantly 
restricted in the manner in which she learns as com-
pared to the average person in the general popula-
tion . ... At the very least, this evidence raises a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding Shepler's disabil-
"t 10 1 y .... 
It is not yet entirely clear how Albertsons, Sutton, and 
Murphy will come to be applied in testing and learning disabili-
10. Shepler v. Northwest Ohio Developmental Center, 2000 WL 191496, at *6 (6" 
Cir.1999) (Gilman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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ties cases in the future. It appears that the Supreme Court's 
decision may come to have the effect of limiting the universe of 
potential plaintiffs seeking accommodations for various learn-
ing disabilities, ranging from "math anxiety" to dyslexia, that 
confront educational institutions. However, the impact of Bart-
lett, and by referenceAlbertsons, Sutton, and Murphy, on learn-
ing disabled students will require further elucidation by the 
courts. 
In the meantime, Judge Gilman's dissenting opinion in 
Shepler provides a useful rationale that could be applied in the 
case of learning disabilities. In educational settings, perhaps 
the question should be whether there is "evidence from which a 
reasonable factfinder could conclude that [a plaintiff] is signifi-
cantly restricted in the manner in which [s]he learns as com-
pared to the average person in the general population."11 Such 
a factual determination or evaluative posture seems more in 
harmony with the ADA's intentions in the relatively challeng-
ing environment of cognitive and learning disabilities. Adher-
ence to too narrow a view on such disabilities, such as has been 
demonstrated by the Supreme Court, may foster a debilitating 
mode of analysis that is blind to the larger expanse of condi-
tions and individuals the ADA was meant to protect. 
11. Id. (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
